When academic researchers participate in commercialization using for-profit firms there is a potentially costly trade-off -their time and effort are diverted away from academic knowledge production. This is a form of brain drain on the not-for-profit research sector that may reduce academic research productivity and adversely impact university performance and long-run economic growth. In this paper, we examine the economic significance of the brain drain phenomenon using scientist-level panel data. Life scientists who start of join firms are compared to a randomly selected control group of their research peers across four indicators of academic research productivity. Combining our statistical results with data on the number of university spin-offs in the U.S. from 1994 to 2004, we find the academic brain drain has a nontrivial impact on knowledge production in the not-for-profit research sector.
Introduction
There is now a convincing body of evidence describing the convergence and co-evolution of scientific and commercial opportunities in the life sciences and the adoption of entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviors by academic life science researchers (Seashore et al. 1989; Dasgupta and David 1994; Powell and Owen-Smith 1998; Etzkowitz 1998 Etzkowitz , 2003 Stephan 1996; Murray 2002; Stuart and Ding 2006) . Academic scientists participate in a wide spectrum of entrepreneurial behaviors and their choices are influenced by university organizational mechanisms and public policies that shape incentives (Lach and Schankerman 2004; Toole and Czarnitzki 2007) . Of particular note is the expanding practice by university administrators of accepting equity in lieu of licensing fees and investing directly in entrepreneurial companies (Desruisseaux 2000; Feldman et al. 2002; Di Gregorio and Shane 2003; Shane 2004) . When combined with the growing use of venture capital and small firm financing programs like the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, life scientists and other university faculty members are increasingly involved in the most extreme form of entrepreneurial behavior -working part-time or full-time on commercialization using for-profit firms (often with an equity interest). 1 To the extent that these academic entrepreneurs devote significant time and cognitive effort to the firm, their contribution to academic knowledge accumulation is likely to fall -a potentially costly "brain drain" on the not-for-profit research sector. 2 This paper explores the economic significance of the brain drain phenomenon by assessing how founding or joining a for-profit firm affects a scientist's academic research performance. University administrators and public policy makers should consider the potential 1 Throughout the paper we will use "university" as shorthand for all not-for-profit research institutions and "faculty" as shorthand for researchers who work in the not-for-profit research sector. 2 While the concept of an academic brain drain could be applied very broadly to include, say, consulting with private industry, we see full-time employment or part-time employment with a vested interest in the firm, either temporary or permanent, as the form of private sector involvement that will induce an academic brain drain.
sacrifice of academic knowledge production when designing and evaluating alternative modes of technology transfer. Effective technology transfer involves understanding and managing the incentives determining how faculty members allocate their time, effort, and commitments to external organizations. Promoting spin-offs relative to patenting or licensing may unintentionally jeopardize the university's research and educational missions. For policy makers, the costs of the academic brain drain stem from its harmful effects on the accumulation of public scientific knowledge and the role this knowledge stock plays in economic growth.
Several empirical studies support the view that academic research is an important factor fueling industry innovation and productivity. Jaffe (1989) presents evidence that university research contributes to state-level corporate patenting. Adams (1990) shows that cumulative stocks of academic research stimulate productivity growth in manufacturing industries. Toole (2009) finds that university research makes a significant contribution to drug innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
Using a case-cohort sampling design, we compiled a scientist-level panel database to examine four indicators of academic research performance: journal publications, impact factor weighted publications, U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) research grants, and university patents. For each of these indicators, the empirical analysis addresses two specific questions.
First, how does the research performance of NIH academic entrepreneurs differ from a randomly selected control group of their NIH research peers during their careers in academe? If the most productive academic researchers are the ones taking employment positions at for-profit firms, the academic brain drain will be larger. Answering this question also provides one way to estimate the magnitude of the brain drain phenomenon. Assuming a one-time permanent employment transition to industry and immediate replacement at the university by an NIH research peer, it can be measured as the relative difference in research performance between the two groups over the period following the employment transition. 3 The second question asks: how does the academic research performance within the group of NIH academic entrepreneurs change once they decide to participate in commercialization by joining a for-profit firm? Answering this question provides an alternative way to estimate the magnitude of the brain drain phenomenon.
It accounts for part-time or temporary employment transitions by incorporating their academic research performance before and after their decision to start or join a firm.
The results show that life scientists who commercialize through the SBIR program perform better (on average) than their NIH research peers during their careers in academe. This holds for journal publications, impact factor weighted publications, the value of NIH research awards, and university patents. We also find a significant decrease in the research performance within the group of NIH academic entrepreneurs after they begin working in for-profit firms for all indicators except university patenting. These results are robust to a variety of changes in the econometric specifications and to scientist unobserved heterogeneity, which may stem from their innate research "ability" or "taste" for scientific puzzles or commercialization (Levin and Stephen 1991; Stern 2004) . Assuming a one-time permanent employment transition to industry and immediate replacement at the university by an NIH research peer, the brain drain costs per academic entrepreneur are 26% fewer journal publications per year and 183% fewer patents per year. To assess the broader economic significance, we compared the cumulative publication and patent output of MIT with estimates of the academic brain drain costs for the period 1994 to 2004. Over this period, numbers equivalent to 81% of MIT's cumulative output of journal publications and 163% of MIT's cumulative output of approved patents were lost to the not-forprofit research sector from the academic brain drain.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the literature supporting the emergence of an academic brain drain phenomenon. Section 3 describes the data and career life cycle models we estimate. Section 4 presents the empirical results and estimates of the economic significance of the academic brain drain along with the limitations of our approach and assumptions. The concluding section discusses some of the implications of our findings.
Prior Literature
Our search of the literature revealed that Zucker and Darby (1996) , Stephan and Levin (1996) , and Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) expressed similar concerns about the movement of academic scientists and its potentially detrimental impact on academic research. Zucker and Darby note that knowledge transfer in people imposes a real cost since it requires a significant redirection of time and energy. Stephan and Levin emphasize the differences in property rights regimes between academe and industry, highlight the shortened lag between basic research discovery and commercialization, and provide a number of interesting anecdotes. Powell and Owen-Smith suggest the changing reward systems within academic research institutions could speed up the outflow of life scientists and weaken the traditional educational and research missions.
The following review of prior research is organized around three observations that form the basis of our concern about an emerging academic brain drain.
The first observation is that academic faculty participation is critical to successful commercialization and that faculty effort devoted to this process increases with economic incentives. Based on survey data from 62 universities, Jenson and Thursby (2001) found that 71% of university inventions required continued faculty participation to have a reasonable chance at successful commercialization. Lowe (2002) and Shane (2004) make this point using case studies of academic spin-offs from the campuses of the University of California and MIT, respectively. Agrawal (2006) , also using a sample drawn from MIT, shows that greater facultyinventor involvement leads to an increased likelihood and degree of commercialization success.
With respect to faculty effort, Lach and Schankerman (2004) find that university licensing income increases with faculty royalty rates. They suggest that higher royalty rates increase faculty effort devoted to commercialization. Thursby et al. (2007) use life cycle models of faculty behavior to show that licensing not only increases total research effort but also increases the ratio of applied to basic research. Since most of this increased effort comes at the expense of faculty leisure time, they do not believe licensing activities are detracting from university knowledge production.
The second observation is that the most productive academic life scientists are the ones involved in the commercialization process with private industry. An influential stream of research suggests that "star" scientists transfer new and valuable academic knowledge to forprofit biotechnology firms (Zucker and Darby 1996; Zucker et al. 1998; Zucker et al. 2002a; Zucker et al. 2002b ). For a sample of life scientists, Stuart and Ding (2006) examine the factors associated with when scientists choose to become entrepreneurs. Using a hazard model, they find that both cumulative publication counts and patent counts are positively related to when a life scientist founds a new biotechnology firm or joins a scientific advisory board (SAB). Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila (2007) examine the academic research productivity of 150 science and engineering faculty entrepreneurs relative to matched control groups of their graduate school peers and their coauthors working at the same institution. They find mixed results across fields.
Biomedical faculty entrepreneurs publish significantly more than their graduate school peers but significantly less than their coauthor peers.
The third observation is that more and more entrepreneurial life scientists are choosing employment in firms, either part-time or full-time, as their commercialization vehicle. As the most extreme form of faculty entrepreneurial behavior, firm employment involves the strongest economic incentives pulling life scientists to venture more completely into the private sector. Audretsch and Stephan (1999) Taken together, these observations suggest a growing number of the most productive academic life scientists are participating in commercialization using for-profit firms and provide a compelling basis for concern about an emergent academic brain drain. Based on the literature, we expect to find that NIH academic entrepreneurs are more productive than their NIH research peers. We also expect to find a decrease in research performance for these entrepreneurial scientists after they become employed at for-profit firms.
Data and Methods
We constructed a novel scientist-level database using a case-cohort sampling design. As discussed in Stuart and Ding (2006) , this sampling design is used by epidemiologists to study rare diseases. To implement the case-cohort design, all of the observed cases of interest in the population are identified and grouped into cohorts. A random sample is drawn from each cohort and this constitutes the control group that is compared to the cases of interest. As described below, the statistical analysis weighted each case and cohort observation by the inverse probability of being selected into the sample. Thus, using the case-cohort sampling design allows one to generalize the statistical findings to the original population.
The population for this study is defined to be all academic life scientists in the fields of Using the SBIR program to identify NIH academic entrepreneurs has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that the SBIR program is an attractive route for academic entrepreneurship. It targets small for-profit firms and has grown into the largest commercialization program in the U.S. 5 Further, it is the only public data source that identifies the principal investigators involved in the firm's research. This principal investigator information provides the link between the not-for-profit and for-profit sectors. To qualify as an SBIR PI, individuals must be employed "full-time" at the small business at the time of award and throughout the duration of the project(s). 6 This requirement provides assurance that we are studying academic entrepreneurs who make non-negligible commitments to their firms as opposed to providing advising or other arms-length services.
European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany, for text field matching and by exploiting the internal consistency of the NIH CRISP database, which includes information on all NIH research project grants and NIH SBIR grants. Each academic entrepreneur in our final group was manually verified. (2008) provide overall descriptions of the firm age, size and industry distribution for the NIH SBIR program. Toole and Czarnitzki (2007) consider the merits of the SBIR program as a policy fostering academic entrepreneurship. 6 Based on the SBIR eligibility rules, the NIH scientists who venture into commercialization spend at least 51% of their time at the for-profit firms at the moment of award and throughout the duration of their projects. We do not observe whether the SBIR academic entrepreneurs hold equity, found new firms, or join established firms.
Notwithstanding these advantages, the SBIR information is subject to some important limitations. One limitation is that the SBIR program represents only one of several modes of commercialization available to NIH-backed academic scientists. For instance, NIH scientists can start or join companies supported by other modes of financing such as venture capital, personal assets, friends and family, and so forth. Using only the SBIR commercialization mode, we are undercounting the actual number of NIH research scientists who choose to leave the academic environment or devote significant effort to entrepreneurial ventures. At the present time, little is known about the population of NIH supported academic entrepreneurs or about the population of academic entrepreneurs more broadly. Further, the SBIR program identifies a financing point in the entrepreneurship process. The receipt of funding necessarily follows the decision to found or join a firm. The next section describes how we address the possibility that the academic entrepreneurs' initial decision to leave academe might be related to their academic research performance.
To form the random control group of NIH research peers, the observed cases of NIH academic entrepreneurs were allocated to medical cohorts defined by fifteen NIH national institutes such as the National Cancer Institute, the National Eye Institute, and so forth. We drew a total random sample of 1,500 researchers from the population of NIH principal investigators with at least one research award from any of the fifteen national institutes after excluding the NIH academic entrepreneurs. It was further required that the NIH research peers have degrees in the fields of biology, chemistry, or health sciences, and have available data on their degree institutions and years from the UMI Proquest Dissertation database or the Internet. These restrictions reduced the control group to 444 life scientists. In the final sample, the ratio of controls to NIH academic entrepreneur cases is about 5:1.
To complete the database, we collected information on each scientist's publication and patenting history. Journal publications were collected from PubMed using the PublicationHarvester software for period 1972 to 1996 (Azoulay et al. 2006) . For each article, journal impact factors were collected from the ISI Web of Knowledge. 7 Searches of the NBER patent database identified all patents assigned to universities on which the scientists are listed as inventors (Hall et al. 2001) . 8 The final scientist-level panel database has 89 NIH academic entrepreneurs and 444 NIH research peers covering the years 1976-1996.
There are two primary explanatory variables in the database. First, to analyze performance differences between NIH academic entrepreneurs and their NIH research peers while in academe, we specified a dummy variable, "AEIN," which takes the value of one for all of those NIH researchers who eventually become employed at a for-profit firm as indicated by winning an SBIR commercialization grant. This variable is constant over their careers in academe and captures differences in research performance levels between the NIH academic entrepreneurs and the control group. Second, since we are interested in examining changes in research performance once an NIH researcher becomes an academic entrepreneur, we specified a dummy variable "AEOUT," which switches from zero to one in the year the NIH researcher becomes an academic entrepreneur through the SBIR program. Clearly, the NIH researchers in the control group never became academic entrepreneurs and these observations cannot be used in this part of our analysis. Using the AEOUT variable, we only look within the group of NIH academic entrepreneurs to analyze differences in research performance due to starting or joining a for-profit firm. To analyze the counts of publications and patents, we use a Poisson model where the conditional mean is an exponential function of the explanatory variables. Using annual data, the value of NIH research grants and impact factor weighted publications are zero for a nontrivial number of observations. We treat these as corner solution and data censored outcomes and estimate Tobit models.
The literature on life cycle models of researcher productivity informs our model specifications (Diamond 1986; Levin and Stephan 1991; Turner and Mairesse 2005; Hall et al. 2007; Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila 2007) . In addition to exogenous time effects, this literature suggests the scientist's age and gradation cohort may have an important influence on their research performance. We include time and graduation cohort dummies in the analysis. Age is defined to be "career age," which is equal to the number of years elapsed since the scientists received their advanced degrees. Career age is usually entered as a quadratic to allow for a nonlinear profile. Also, there may be unobserved heterogeneity among individual scientists due to differences in their abilities or tastes for research. This suggests controlling for scientist fixed effects in the empirical analysis.
The next section presents regression results for both pooled and unobserved effects
Poisson and Tobit models. An advantage of the pooled models over the unobserved effects models is that they do not impose the assumption of strict exogeneity. This assumption rules out feedback from current realizations of the dependent variable to future values of the explanatory variables. Unobserved effects models impose the strict exogeneity assumption, but have the advantage of controlling for unobserved time constant heterogeneity. As pointed out by Wooldridge (1997) , the fixed effects estimator is not more robust than the pooled estimator, but imposes a different set of assumptions.
In order to obtain estimates of the time constant explanatory variables for publications and patents when controlling for fixed effects, we follow Turner and Mairesse (2005) and use a two-step estimation method. The first step regresses the performance measure on the time varying explanatory variables using the fixed effects Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML)
estimator. In the second step, the unexplained variation in the dependent variable is regressed on the time constant variables using non-linear least squares. 11 The model can be formulated as:
(1) First step:
where y it is the performance measure for individual i at time t. X it are the time varying explanatory variables, Z i are the time constant explanatory variables, and α i is the unobserved effect for individual i.
To control for fixed effects in the models for impact factor weighted publications and NIH grants, we use an unobserved effects Tobit model suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 540-1) . Unlike the usual random effects Tobit, this model allows the unobserved effect to be correlated with explanatory variables. Under appropriate assumptions we can write:
where y it is the performance measure for individual i at time t. X it are the time varying explanatory variables, i X are the time averages of the time-varying explanatory variables, and α i is the unobserved effect for individual i.
Throughout the empirical analysis we assume the control variables satisfy the appropriate exogeneity assumptions for the methods used. Looking back at Table 1 , this assumption is reasonable because most of the explanatory variables are either predetermined or not under the control of the academic scientists. For instance, the career age, degree year, degree institution, and the gender variables are all strictly exogenous. Lagged publications and lagged NIH awards are predetermined. That is, they can be assumed to be exogenous in the pooled regressions models but may not be strictly exogenous as required for the fixed effect models.
The exogeneity of our key explanatory variables, AEIN and AEOUT, is more complicated because these variables are determined from the observed behavior of the NIH scientists. Life cycle models provide some insight into the scientist's decision to found or join a firm (Levy 1988; Levin and Stephan 1991) . In these models academic scientists build their reputations over time by accumulating human capital through various means such as publications, grants, and patents. At any point, these scientists may choose to "cash in" on their accumulated human capital by founding or joining a firm in the private sector. Holding past research performance constant, this framework suggests the decision to pursue entrepreneurship depends on the scientist's expected (or future) human capital accumulation. Unobserved shocks to expected human capital accumulation could influence when the scientist chooses to exit, as captured by AEIN and AEOUT, and also be related to contemporaneous research performance.
For analyzing research performance differences between NIH academic entrepreneurs and their peers while in academe using AEIN, the sample observations for the group of academic entrepreneurs were dropped after the date of their first SBIR commercialization grant. This avoids confounding their research performance while in academe with their research performance after they leave. However, one may be concerned that academic entrepreneurs experience an unobserved positive shock to their research productivity just prior to leaving which induces an upward bias on our estimate of their average research performance using AEIN. To examine the sensitivity of our results to this possibility, we lagged the date of their first SBIR award by one, three, and five years. This effectively drops the NIH academic entrepreneurs out of academe one, three, and five years earlier than their observed date of leaving. Our results using AEIN were not sensitive to these changes in the timing of when the NIH academic entrepreneurs leave academe.
For our analysis of changes in academic research performance within the group of NIH academic entrepreneurs using AEOUT, the sample included all annual observations before and after receipt of their first SBIR commercialization grant. In this setup, an unobserved shock to their expected research productivity could be related to both the timing of their exit as captured by AEOUT and their contemporaneous research performance. To address this possibility, we performed tests for endogeneity in the regression models using AEOUT. The tests were based on the two-step method introduced by Smith and Blundell (1986) for Tobit models and adapted to count data models as show in Wooldridge (2002) . As instruments, we used lagged values of venture capital investment, income per capita, and population in the scientists' local geographic regions. This approach assumes that lagged economic activity in the scientists' regions is uncorrelated with any shock to their expected academic research productivity, but is correlated with their decision to pursue entrepreneurship. 12 These regional variables were highly correlated with AEOUT in the first stage regressions. Since none of the tests found statistically significant evidence of endogeneity, we did not pursue the issue further in our empirical analysis.
Empirical Results
This section presents the regression results for each of the four indicators of research performance. Recall that we are interested in two specific questions regarding these indicators:
(1) how does the research performance of NIH academic entrepreneurs differ from a randomly selected control group of their NIH research peers during their careers in academe?; and (2) how does the academic research performance within the group of NIH academic entrepreneurs change once they decide to participate in commercialization by joining a for-profit firm? We begin by discussing the statistical findings for each indicator. This is followed by an exploratory estimate of the costs of academic brain drain to the not-for-profit research sector.
Analysis of Journal Publications
Our first indicator is a scientist's journal publications per year. This is a traditional measure of academic research performance and captures aspects of both knowledge production and dissemination in public science. Models 1-3 on the left side of Table 2 correspond to the pooled and fixed effects Poisson QML estimators for the number of journal publications per year. The results incorporate sampling weights and account for heteroscedasticity as well as arbitrary within-group correlation of the error terms. Using the pooled estimator, Model 1 shows the key variable AEIN is positive and significant at a 5% level. Relative to the control group of NIH research peers, NIH academic entrepreneurs publish about 26% more articles per year on average during their careers in academe. Consistent with the life cycle productivity literature, the results for career age show a concave publication profile. NIH researchers reach their peak number of publications nearly nineteen years after their advanced degree. The cohort dummy variables based on degree year were never significant and were dropped from the model. The value of NIH research awards, which enters the regression specification as a lagged sum of NIH awards over the previous four years, significantly increases journal publications per year.
Among the time-constant explanatory variables, NIH researchers with degrees from medical schools and foreign institutions publish more journal articles. NIH researchers with Ph.D.
degrees publish significantly less than those with MD degrees.
The next two columns in Table 2 report the results for Model 2 which uses the two-step fixed effects Poisson QML estimator. This method allows for unobserved scientist heterogeneity, which may stem from a scientist's innate ability or taste for research, but imposes strict exogeneity on the explanatory variables. For our key variable, AEIN, the results are robust and continue to show that NIH academic entrepreneurs publish more journal articles on average than their NIH research peers during their careers in academe. Their academic publication profile is the same as in Model 1. The coefficient on lagged NIH research awards is positive and significant but quite a bit smaller than in Model 1. It is not possible to tell whether this is due to controlling for scientist fixed effects or failure of the strict exogeneity assumption. The cohort dummy variables based on degree year were jointly significant and included in the second step estimation. For the time-constant explanatory variables, NIH researchers with Ph.D. degrees continue to publish significantly less than those holding MD degrees. Degrees from foreign institutions are no longer associated with publishing significantly more and degrees from medical schools are only marginally significant and positive. Interestingly, after controlling for unobserved scientist heterogeneity, the female indicator became negative and significant at a 5%
level. This result is consistent with a number of prior studies that find a gender gap in scientific publication. The reasons underlying this gap remain unclear, but Xie and Shauman (1998) suggest this "productivity puzzle" is largely due to differences in personal and structural characteristics such as marital status and teaching hours.
Model 3 examines how annual journal publications of NIH academic entrepreneurs change after they become employed at a for-profit firm. The estimates are based on the Poisson QML fixed effects estimator using only the scientist-year observations on the NIH academic entrepreneurs. The key explanatory variable, AEOUT, is negative and significant at a 5% level.
On average, NIH academic entrepreneurs reduce their journal publications per year by about 19% after they join for-profit firms. Their career publication profile is concave and reaches its peak just under twenty years after their advanced degree. Past NIH research awards are associated with more journal publications at a 10% level of significance.
Models 4-6 on the right side of Table 2 and those who have degrees from public institutions publish in journals that received fewer citations per article. As found in the analysis of publication counts, after controlling for unobserved scientist heterogeneity, the female indicator is negative and significant which suggests women NIH scientists publish in journals with lower citations per article. This appears to be another dimension of the gender productivity puzzle mentioned above.
Looking at the change in weighted publications within the group of academic entrepreneurs, Model 6 shows the key variable AEOUT is negative and significant at a 5% level. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity eliminates these effects, but having a Ph.D. relative to an MD degree becomes associated with larger NIH grants.
Model 3 of Table 3 shows the change in the value of NIH research awards received by NIH academic entrepreneurs after starting or joining a firm. The key variable, AEOUT, is negative and significant at a 1% level. On average, grantsmanship through the NIH drops after academic entrepreneurs take employment positions in the private sector. As before, more journal publications are associated with greater NIH awards. For NIH academic entrepreneurs, none of the time constant explanatory variables are significantly related to the value of NIH grants.
Analysis of Patents
Our final indicator of research performance is the number of patents assigned to universities on which the NIH scientist appears as an inventor. This is the least traditional indicator of academic performance, but it has become increasingly important as university attitudes and policies have become more supportive of commercialization activities.
Nevertheless, patenting appears less important than journal publications as an indicator of academic knowledge accumulation. For the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Agrawal and Henderson (2002) find that professors place much greater emphasis on academic papers in spite of the fact that MIT is one of the most prolific patenting academic institutions.
Over the fifteen year period in their study, almost half the faculty never patented and only 10-20% of the faculty actively patented in any year. In our sample of 89 NIH academic entrepreneurs only 27% were granted patents in any year.
Model 1 of Table 4 shows the results using the pooled Poisson QML estimator for the number of university patents. The key variable AEIN is positive and significant at a 5% level.
The Model 3 of Table 4 shows the fixed effects Poisson QML results using only those observations on NIH academic entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, the sample size for this regression is inadequate since it relies on information from only twenty-four NIH academic entrepreneurs.
The key variable AEOUT is negative, but insignificant. The patenting career profile does not have the same shape. Both Age and Age2 are jointly significant and negative. Since patenting is relatively new to the academic environment and has not been part of the expected research output of older life scientists, it is not surprising to find that patenting decreases with career age in our sample.
Economic Significance of the Academic Brain Drain
Our objective in this subsection is to estimate the costs of the academic brain drain for the whole not-for-profit research sector. A major component of these costs is the lost research output due to the employment of academic researchers at for-profit firms. We calculate the lost research output for journal publications and patents. 14 Our objective requires us to generalize our regression results and impose a number of fairly strong auxiliary assumptions. As will be clear, estimating the costs of the academic brain drain phenomenon introduces a number of unresolved conceptual and measurement issues. For this reason, the reader should be cautious when interpreting the broader cost estimates since they are exploratory and speculative.
Nevertheless, the estimates allow us to gauge the order of magnitude of the academic brain drain and obtain a sense of its economic significance.
Our starting point is to assume that NIH academic entrepreneurs make a one-time permanent employment transition to industry and are replaced immediately at the university by an NIH research peer. 15, 16 The lost research output is given by the marginal effect of the AEIN variable from the pooled models in Tables 2 and 4 . From these models, each NIH academic entrepreneur publishes 25.5% more in journals per year (0.51 more articles) and patents 183% more per year (0.033 more patents) than their NIH research peers. 17 As we used sampling weights in the regression analysis, these estimates are statistically valid for the target population considered in this study, namely the 61,000 life science researchers in the fields of biology, chemistry, and the health sciences who won at least one research award from the NIH between 1972 and 1996.
To obtain broader estimates of the brain drain costs for the life science segment of the not-for-profit research sector, we would like to know how many individuals in the population of 61,000 life scientists chose to start or join for-profit firms. Unfortunately, this type of data is not available for the life science segment or for any other segment of academic researchers in the not-for-profit research sector. The only systematic data source we could find comes from the annual surveys of universities conducted by The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM). Their surveys ask universities to report the annual number of companies formed around a license of intellectual property from the university, a relatively narrow definition. These data cover all university spin-offs regardless of whether they are life science related, engineering related, or something else.
Given this data constraint, to obtain exploratory estimates of the brain drain costs for the whole not-for-profit research sector, we impose four assumptions. First, the marginal differences in research output of NIH academic entrepreneurs found in this study are representative of the marginal differences in research output for all academic entrepreneurs in all fields of study.
Second, the average career age at which NIH academic entrepreneurs choose employment at forprofit firms is the same for all academic entrepreneurs in all fields. In our study, the average career age at exit is 16.56 years after their advanced degree. Assuming a 35 year career for each academic researcher implies the not-for-profit research sector loses 18.44 career years for each academic entrepreneur. Third, all university spin-off companies have one academic entrepreneur. Fourth, the AUTM data are accurate.
Under these assumptions and using AUTM data on university spin-offs for 1994 through 2004, While provocative, a number of unresolved conceptual and measurement issues need to be addressed in future research to improve on these estimates. First, it is clear that our estimates do not measure a net loss to social welfare since we cannot measure the value created by our exiting scientists in the private sector. The social cost from this form of academic entrepreneurship may be offset by the social benefit created through their work in the private sector. Second, it remains unclear how to appropriately value lost academic publications and patents when calculating the cost to the not-for-profit research sector. The economic value distributions for academic publications and patents are likely to be highly skewed . One approach would be to weight publications and patents by forward citations, however, this requires a long time series and the citation data are not available for this study. 
Conclusion
19 If this calculation were based on the fixed effects regression using only NIH academic entrepreneurs (column 4 of Table 2 ), 67% of MIT's cumulative publication output would be lost. We do not use the fixed effects regression using only NIH academic entrepreneurs for university patents because the sample size of twenty-four entrepreneurs is too small to be reliable.
Our analysis highlights an increasing trend among university faculty to pursue commercialization using employment positions at for-profit firms. This is the most extreme form of faculty entrepreneurship because it involves the strongest incentives drawing the faculty members' time and effort away from academic research. We argue that this form of academic entrepreneurship trades off academic knowledge accumulation for commercialization activitiesan academic brain drain that may adversely affect the organizational mission of universities as well as prospects for long-run economic growth. Based on the data used in this analysis, the academic brain drain appears to be nontrivial and warrants further research to assess its magnitude and implications.
The trade off between academic knowledge accumulation and commercialization of university-based discoveries has important implications for university administrators as they continue to grapple with how to define and evaluate alternative organizational mechanisms fostering technology transfer. Our results suggest that current practices, particularly related to promoting spin-offs, have not successfully balanced the research and educational missions of the university against the more recent push to foster commercialization. Some sacrifice of academic knowledge production and student training seems unavoidable as faculty members become more involved in commercialization activities. An important part of this involvement, however, appears to be the form of faculty entrepreneurial behavior and the incentives imbedded within these forms. At least among NIH supported life scientists, our research indicates that active faculty employment in for-profit firms costs the university in terms of journal publications, impact factors weighted publications, NIH research awards, and patents. Clearly, more research is needed to understand how variations in the form of academic entrepreneurship relate to commercialization outcomes, academic research performance, and successful student training.
At this point, we hope university administrators will acknowledge the potential costs from the academic brain drain and will incorporate this information into their managerial assessments of the costs and benefits of alternative commercialization mechanisms.
The same can be said about policies intended to promote the commercialization of university-based discoveries at the state and federal levels. When academic scientists use small firm financing programs, the social cost from lost academic research and student training must be weighed against the social benefit derived from commercialization -when it's successful.
Once again, the form of faculty involvement is pivotal because it mediates the degree to which the faculty member is drawn away from academic research. At the very least, as entrepreneurship policies grow in popularity around the world, policymakers need to be clear about how the incentive structures in their policies influence the performance of academic research. While our research has taken an initial step in this direction, we are careful to note (see the discussion at the end of section IV) that a number of difficult conceptual and measurement issues remain to be addressed in future research. Accounting for 4 years of NIH grants as control variable is motivated due to the fact that the average project duration is around 4 years.
* Gender was determined by the first name of the researchers and internet searches. Models V and VI: The Mean(.) variables are the individual specific means of the time-varying covariates which are added to the Tobit panel estimations to allow for correlation of the individual specific effects and the explanatory variables (see Wooldridge, 2002) . Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicate a 1% (5, 10%) significance level.
Models II and III: The Mean(.) variables are the individual specific means of the time-varying covariates which are added to the panel estimations to allow for correlation of the individual specific effects and the explanatory variables (see Wooldridge, 2002 
